DOCUMENT RESUME

ED 185 551 CS 205 457

AUTHOR Pemberton, Janette E.
TITLE Discussions on Aristotle's "Ethics": Implications for Teachers and Administrators.
PUB DATE 22 Feb 80
NOTE 62p.

EDRS PRICE MF01/PC03 Plus Postage.
DESCRIPTORS *Administrator Role; Educational Objectives; Elementary Secondary Education; *Ethics; Higher Education; Interpersonal Relationship; *Moral Values; *Philosophy; *Speech Communication; Student Teacher Relationship; Teacher Behavior; *Teacher Role
IDENTIFIERS *Aristotle

ABSTRACT

A number of passages from Aristotle's "Ethics" are discussed in this paper, and their implications for teachers and administrators are examined. Among the many topics considered in relation to teaching and administration are: the importance of performing duties for their own sakes, the indispensability of knowledge, the need for clear-cut goals and objectives, the roles of knowledge and of virtue, the difference between willing and unwilling actions, the development of a virtuous character, value formation, equalization of values, the relationships between practical wisdom and virtue and between pleasure and self-restraint, the basis of true friendship, and the need to exhibit equal friendliness toward others. (GT)

****
* Reproductions supplied by EDRS are the best that can be made *
* from the original document. *
****

U S DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH,
EDUCATION & WELFARE
NATIONAL INSTITUTE OF
EDUCATION

THIS DOCUMENT HAS BEEN REPRODUCED EXACTLY AS RECEIVED FROM THE PERSON OR ORGANIZATION ORIGINATING IT. POINTS OF VIEW OR OPINIONS STATED DO NOT NECESSARILY REPRESENT OFFICIAL NATIONAL INSTITUTE OF EDUCATION POSITION OR POLICY

ED185551

Discussions on Aristotle's "Ethics": Implications for Teachers and Administrators

by

Janette E. Pemberton
Prince George's Community College
Largo, Maryland

"PERMISSION TO REPRODUCE THIS MATERIAL HAS BEEN GRANTED BY

Janette E. Pemberton

TO THE EDUCATIONAL RESOURCES INFORMATION CENTER (ERIC)."

February 22, 1980

CS205457

> If, then there is some end of the things we do which we desire for its own sake, everything else being desired for the sake of this, and if we do not choose everything for the sake of something else (for at that rate the process would go on to infinity, so that our desire would be empty and vain), clearly this must be the good and chief good. Will not the knowledge of it, then have a great influence on life? Shall we not, like archers who have a mark to aim at, be more likely to hit upon what is right?
>
> Ethics, Book I

Aristotle discusses this statement in the context of the single end which is "the good and the best," and which is represented as the goal of statesmanship or political science in the exercise of its systematic function. Notwithstanding the fact that the goal for the state and the goal for the individual are the same, the end for the state is considered greater and more complete on the whole, however, it is understood that the thinking required for a man's arrangement of his own life should correspond to the thinking of the statesman although on a smaller scale. Inherent in the statement is the doctrine that there is a single end which the individual must keep constantly in mind as he plans his own life.

One implication of this statement for the teacher is that he or she desires teaching for its own sake. Good teaching, then, becomes the chief end in life and a knowledge of how to teach will influence the end result. The good teacher must first have a natural love and desire for teaching. When once this special quality is present, other attributes of successful teaching such as dedication, devotion to duty, and thoroughness will follow. The teacher who is inspired by a love of teaching for its own sake and who has a keen interest in the subject matter--as well as in the students--will be highly successful.

Aristotle's emphasis on the performance of a duty for its own sake is a challenge to other views, namely, doing something for ulterior motives or for

pecuniary purposes. For instance, it is sometimes charged that the leaders of teachers' unions are more concerned with the pecuniary aspects of teaching than with teaching for its own sake or for the good that it can do.

The statement under discussion also has implications for the practice of moving excellent teachers into administrative positions. It is well known that as soon as good teachers prove themselves they are taken from the classrooms and made administrators. Many of these teachers have known success because of their desire for teaching for its own sake. Like archers who have a mark to aim at, they make successful teaching their goal and "chief good" and their great talent for teaching can only be wasted when they are diverted from that end.

It is important to note that there is another view implied in the question of doing something for its own sake which Aristotle discusses. In fact, the statement is conditional, being introduced by the word "if." Aristotle seems to be hinting to at least two things: that while there might be somethings that are not desired for themselves, there are definitely other things that are desired for their own sakes. Truly the force of this statement can be compared to statements like "knowledge for its own sake," and knowledge for utility," or "art for art's sake" and "art for utility." Aristotle is emphatically stating that if there were one such object, and one only, that is desired for its own sake, this fact would be important for the conduct of life.

When once the double side of the question is seriously contemplated, the implications for both teaching and administration become clear. Teaching, usually considered as art, can be most successful when it is pursued for its own sake. Administration, on the other hand, is usually viewed as a science; consequently it tends to connote utility. Aristotle suggests that knowledge of what we are doing is most important. Hence, whether we are engaged in

teaching or administration, or both, knowledge is indispensable.

The importance of Aristotle's allusion to knowledge cannot be overlooked. The classical traditionalists hold the view of knowledge for its own sake, while the modern empiricists emphasize knowledge for the sake of doing. In general, teaching aims at the imparting of a body of knowledge, while administration implies a knowledge of how to get things done. Whether in teaching or in administration, however, it must be admitted that it is important to possess a store of information and to have an understanding of a body of knowledge. The main issue is whether such knowledge is an end in itself or whether it is a means to the end of successful human activity. Such an end should be definite and should be limited to a specific purpose.

Aristotle was quite clear in showing the need to limit desires. He argues that there must be an end which terminates the series of means and subordinate ends of action. Indeed, some object of desire, some object to be attained by action which is ultimate to man, or which is desirable, should be set as the goal. If this be not so, man would be faced with a process of ad infinitum in his desires and, therefore, in his aims. Desire would be directed to an indefinitely receding object: it would be aimless in that it would never terminate upon an object. If therefore, action had to wait on such indeterminate desire, it would never take place. These principles have important lessons for both teachers and administrators.

The need for clear-cut goals and objectives in teaching and administration can be compared to the need for specific ends and desires in human activity outlined by Aristotle. The goals and objectives of curriculum development in teaching or administration provide good examples in this respect. In establishing such goals, one has to consider whether the demands of society or

the nature and needs of the individual should be the determining factor. It is true that it is difficult to defend either premise in its extreme form. Every socially oriented program considers individual needs to some extent, and every psychologically based curriculum necessarily has some social orientation.

It cannot be too strongly stressed that there should be definite stated goals and objectives in teaching and in administration as courses of study for students are formulated. Under earlier concepts of the curriculum as facts-to-be-learned, the curriculum was prepared in advance by specialists and embodied in written courses of study. The chief task of the administrator was to assure that each teacher covered the course of study for his students. But under the currently advocated concept of the curriculum as experiences, the task of curriculum development now becomes one of improving the nature and quality of the students' experiences. When this objective undergirds the purpose and objective of teaching and administration, then as Aristotle states, man is likely "to hit upon what is right."

> Since our present inquiry has not, like the others, a merely speculative aim (i.e. we are inquiring not merely in order to know what virtue is, but in order to become good, for otherwise the knowledge would avail us nothing), we must investigate the subject of moral actions and inquire how they are to be performed.
>
> Ethics, Book II

In this statement, Aristotle makes two very strong points: (1) The importance of knowledge for its own sake, and (2) knowledge for the purpose of being good. He seems to be saying that the end of all man's strivings is virtue or goodness, indeed, he sets a very high priority on virtue. Nature has given man the capacity to receive virtue, and this capacity is developed through knowledge and habit. Virtue or excellence is therefore of two kinds: intellectual and moral.

The development of virtue is paramount in Aristotle's discussions. He holds that while the intellectual aspect of virtue is developed through knowledge, moral excellence comes as a result of habit. Since moral virtue mainly depends on habit formation, the character of the end result depends on character of single acts toward that end. The single acts must therefore be of a particular character if they must lead to a particular moral end. Only by doing things well habitually can one become good. If, however, one does the same things badly, he becomes bad, or at least, he destroys whatever good or excellence he might possess.

The role of knowledge is very important in the development of intellectual virtues. This fact has great implications for teaching. Aristotle himself notes that "intellectual excellence owes its birth and growth mainly to teaching." In this respect, the role of the teacher must be emphasized. There are three aspects of the educative process which the good teacher must keep in

mind as he or she aims at helping students to achieve intellectual excellence: (1) the formation of educational objectives; (2) the organization of learning experiences; and (3) the evaluation of learning. Teaching, or the educative act, begins with a conception of a desired change in behavior.

As the teacher seeks to impart knowledge, and consequently, to change behavior, it is important that educational objectives be specific if such change of behavior is to be effected. For example, the primary aims in the teaching of arithmetic are (1) to acquaint students with quantitative relationships as an aid to their daily application of them, and (2) to develop their abilities to understand problems of present-day living that deal with number and quantitative relationships. Similarly, teaching English at College level embraces a complex process which involves the acquisition of many behaviors ranging from learning to recognize certain elements of language to being able to make a critical analysis of a novel.

Aristotle insists on the need "to know what virtue is." This clearly involves the imparting of knowledge or teaching, and this teaching, he thinks "requires experience and time." The experienced teacher not only formulates educational objectives, but also organizes and arranges the learning environment; this environment itself consists of certain experiences. The function of the psychology of learning is to determine the relationship between experiences and the behavior learned in response to these experiences. It is the responsibility of the teacher to integrate what he or she knows about the students and the learning process, and to create experiences that will produce the desired changes in behavior.

The time factor alluded to by Aristotle in his statement on the importance

of teaching in its relationship to knowledge and virtue, is also very important. This aspect points to the third phase in the educative process, that of evaluation of the learning. It is only with time that the teacher can systematically determine whether the expected and desired behavior changes have in fact taken place. The evaluative process consists of a set of complex judgments made by the teacher about student learning. The teacher puts together all the information he has accumulated over a period of time about a given student in order to be able to evaluate the student's learning; new learning experiences are then provided on the basis of the judgment arrived at in this evaluation.

In the statement being discussed, Aristotle states that it is important to know what virtue is. But he goes further. In no uncertain terms he emphasizes that the end is "not merely in order to know what virtue is, but in order to become good." Aristotle repeatedly points to the importance of goodness, right principles, and conduct. He warns against anything including inexact theories, deficiencies, or excesses that would destroy man's capacity to be virtuous. Such emphasis on virtue as the end of all knowledge and learning has important implications for the moral and aesthetic aspect of teaching. In the midst of the quest for material well-being, there are the occasional voices which insistently seek to draw attention to the need for more emphasis on the tested values of human experience--the widsom, goodness, and beauty that man has found essential for the enrichment of life. The teacher's concern with this moral aspect can serve as a guide to imparting knowledge to his students.

On the other hand, the realities of the materialistic age in which man lives also make great demands on both the teacher and the administrator. There is a marked difference in viewpoint concerning knowledge in Aristotle's Ethics

and in Sayles and Strauss' Human Behavior in Organizations. Aristotle insists that essential virtue or goodness should be the prime motivating factor in all man's actions. He likens the acquisition of a moral virtue to the acquisition of a craft. The object of the craftsman is to produce a piece of work which is good and that goodness is comprised in the work itself. A shoemaker aims at making a good pair of shoes just as a teacher aims at making good students or as an administrator aims at good organization. But first, it is important to know what that good is and then how to arrive at it.

In his arguments, Aristotle strongly suggests that knowledge should be one with character. A craftsman is good if his product is good, the goodness of his character being deduced from the goodness of his product. But the fact that an act is called just, if it is such as a just man would do, impelled Aristotle to warn that knowledge is also detachable from character. For an act which is called just might indeed have been done by a not so just man. Certainly, therefore, must be established, that the just act not only resembles the act that a just man would do, but that it be actually performed by a just man. The knowledge, then, which must aid in the production of something good, must of necessity be the kind of knowledge which involves the development of the whole character of man. Only in that way will knowledge and virtue become one.

Sayles and Strauss in Human Behavior in Organizations discuss knowledge from another standpoint. They agree that "the desire for knowledge is a basic element in human beings." But this is not the kind of knowledge which has virtue as its aim; indeed, this is knowledge for some useful tangible end. Sayles and Strauss state that "People like to know not only what is happening to them, but why; they want both to understand the present and to predict the future." The

authors further point to the constructive and practical elements of knowledge--knowledge which gives an expert a sense of achievement and progress.

The question of goodness or virtue is also viewed from a different standpoint by Sayles and Strauss. While Aristotle sees goodness as a virtue in itself for its own sake, Sayles and Strauss view the principle of being "good" as a means to an end: "As a substitute for 'be strong,' many managements have adopted the philosophy of 'be good.' They have sought to raise employee morale by providing good working conditions, fringe benefits, employee services, high wages, and decent, fair supervision." The meaning of "goodness" here has implications for administrators as they endeavor to motivate their employees. A good worker, in the context of Sayles and Strauss, means a hard worker with emphasis on productivity, compared to Aristotle's good craftsman, with emphasis on goodness for its own sake.

Knowledge and virtue constitute the main aspects of the discussion presented here. On the one hand, Aristotle tends to equate a knowledge of virtue with virtue itself--a knowledge of virtue is necessary for achieving the state of goodness. Knowledge then is useful in that it engenders goodness. On the other hand, Sayles and Strauss stress not that knowledge which leads to goodness for its own sake, but that knowledge which results in progress. They also imply that even if knowledge leads to "being good," that goodness is not fot its own sake, but rather as a means to an end.

These divergent views on knowledge have implications both for teaching and administration. From Aristotle's standpoint, knowledge and virtue for their own sakes have implications for teachers and administrators in encouraging the quality of goodness for its own sake as a cardinal principle for those aspiring to be good professionals for the sake of being good. From the standpoint of

Sayles and Strauss, there are also implications for teachers and administrators. More and more teachers are organizing and demanding those benefits which inspire good teaching and which lead to higher wages. More and more administrators are employing the "be good" philosophy to inspire loyalty among their employers.

A compromise should be sought between these two views. One may conclude like Aristotle that "the good of man is an acitvity of the soul" in accordance with virtue, or if there be more than one, in accordance with the best and most perfect of them. There is no doubt that Sayles and Strauss too might claim that there is virtue in their idea of being good, for they might consider that to know what a good shoe is and how to make it, is comparatively a mere superficial knowledge. The important thing, however, is to know what the right ideals in life are, and how to secure them. This is the knowledge which speaks to the whole character of man, and which will guide him to sure fulfilment.

> As an action is unwilling if done either under compulsion or through ignorance, we may characterize an action as willing when its moving principle lies in the agent, and when the agent is cognizant of the particular circumstances in which the act is performed.
>
> Ethics. Book III

In this statement Aristotle is particularly concerned with the need to differentiate between willing and unwilling actions. He contends that it is often difficult to distinguish between them. Very often the circumstances under which the actions are performed become the deciding factor. An act is deemed willing if it is traced to deliberate decisions, and the person performing the act is considered the agent or efficient cause. The difficulty in deciding what is willing action and what is unwilling is exemplified in the case of a captain who decides to throw cargo overboard in order to save lives in a storm.

An act is considered willing providing that (a) the initiative is in the agent (i.e. it is not compulsory) and (b) that the agent knows the particular features in the situation which affect the actual result of his acting. Such actions, however, depend on a number of conditions including actions which the agent cannot properly be said to do at all, actions which he does without a clear understanding of what he is doing, and actions which he is obliged to do because of some emergency.

But the very conditions which help determine willing actions at

times help to determine unwilling actions. Of course, the two broad principles subscribed to by Aristotle as determining unwilling actions are compulsion and ignorance. The clearest case of compulsion is where the efficient cause is outside of the agent, i.e. where the agent contributes nothing to the cause. Yet, if the agent is forced to do certain things which he would not do other wise, through fear of greater evil or through hope of greater good, then such actions should be considered willing rather than unwilling.

These concepts of willing and unwilling actions have important implications for teaching. Such implications are perceived in the relations between the teacher and the student as these effect the behavior change outcome of teaching. The teacher's behavior is a stimulus which is likely to evoke certain kinds of responses from students. One way in which this stimulus behavior may be seen from the veiwpoint of the student is as a source of control over need-satisfactions. Some of these need-satisfactions are tied to the learning experience, and these can present problems for the teachers who might not be aware that the means students have already learned for satisfying their needs are frequently incompatible with the goals of a learning situation.

The teacher's ability to exercise control over need-satisfactions of students can be considered as willing action in the light of the present discussion. The initiative here is in the agent, i.e. the teacher, and that agent knows the particular features of the situation

needed to bring about the actual result of his acting. Such actions are guided by a thorough knowledge of the situation. The teacher's actions should motivate students in a particular learning experience. Students in a classroom are always motivated in some way, but the problem is to help them seek the goals implicit in the learning situation and to obtain satisfaction from the attainment of these goals.

Another implication of willing actions for teaching is the use of rewards and punishment as incentives for inducing or strengthening behavior change. An "A" grade may be an incentive of this kind. The teacher assumes that if a student wants a high grade he will work to achieve the goals of the learning experience. On the other hand, what the teacher assumes to be rewards and punishments may not be so regarded by the students. Some students may be discouraged by low marks while others may not work for high marks because the attaining of a mark has little if any goal for them; they may or may not see a high mark as a way of obtaining need-satisfaction. In that way, rewards and punishments will produce willing or unwilling actions on the part of students as they respond in accordance with their need-satisfactions.

Important implications for administration are also seen in the concepts of willing and unwilling actions. Sayles and Strauss in Human Behavior in Organizations point to the effectiveness of postive management actions (i.e. willing actions) in improving mass-production jobs. In an effort to reduce boredom, some companies systematically

move workers from one job to another. When boredom is thereby reduced, willing action is promoted on the part of the workers. Management goes a step further to stimulate willing action by allowing the workers themselves to make decisions for job rotation. Similary, higher education administration enhances its effectiveness through the rotation of its faculty members and through allowing them to decide voluntarily what committees they desire to head or to serve as members. Aristotle warns that compulsion will produce unwilling actions and Sayles and Strauss tend to agree. But it should not be overlooked that the extra emphasis on choice in Sayles and Strauss is intended for the benefit of the company particularly. For the happier the workers are, the more dedicated they will be to their tasks and the greater will be the productivity.

Aristotle injects the importance of knowledge intermittently in his discussions of willing and unwilling actions. In addition to compulsion he notes that ignorance also lies at the root of unwilling actions. And what is ignorance but the lack of knowledge! Therefore, an unwilling act is excusable if it is due to ignorance of certain detailed features in the particular situation and insofar as that ignorance could not have been avoided. It is also important to distinguish between an act done owing to ignorance and an act done in ignorance. A man is not excused if he acts in ignorance even if he repents when he comes to himself. Criminals may be said to commit crime in ignorance, i.e., through a lack of knowledge of what is

once, for at least each man should know his own identity. Sayles and Strauss also warn against the danger of ignorance. They point to the insecurity and unrest among workers that stem from a lack of knowledge of the preferences, attitudes, and idiosyncracies of a new supervisor. The implications for both teaching and administration are clear. Teachers need to know their students, as students need to know their teachers. Administrators must also know those they supervise and vice versa. Such reciprocal knowledge engenders great success.

Much of the success achieved in both teaching and administration may be said to be attributed to that kind of willing action whose "moving principle lies in the agent," as Aristotle states. On the part of the teacher this moving principle may be a desire to satisfy the normative as well as the psychological needs of the students. These, then, become the goals and objectives of his teaching. Normative needs represent adult expectations of what a student should need - whether he or she knows it or not. A psychological need, on the other hand, represents a state of tension within the student, and constitutes the basis for the student's striving for particular kinds of goals. These polarized ends present a problem for the teacher.

The good teacher seeks a compromise between the normative and psychological needs of the students. Cognizance of the need for this end can constitute the basis for his moving principle. Starting with

statements of educational objectives which represent normative needs or goals that the educated person will have attained, the teacher must utilize the actual motives and goals of students in such a way that they will strive for desirable goals. Indeed, both the teacher and the administrator should know how to utilize the need systems of those they are responsible for, as motivating factors toward seeking goals which are regarded as desirable by the larger society.

It should be specially noted that while much stress is generally placed on goals and ends in Aristotle's Ethics, equal emphasis is also placed on means to the end as the object of deliberation. In the statement under discussion much emphasis is placed upon compulsion and ignorance as the means to unwilling action which is the end. Similarly, the moving principle in the agent and the agent's knowledge of the particular circumstances of an act constitute the means toward the end which is willing action.

Therefore, teachers and administrators need to take ~~this~~ seriously into account the manner in which they go about their tasks. They will find that there is much to learn from Aristotle's conclusions "that (1) man is the originating principle of his actions, (2) that deliberation is concerned with things within the subject's own power to accomplish, and (3) that all our actions aim at ends distinct from themselves." This last is particularly important. For the teacher, his actions go far beyond mere instruction to molding and effecting the character and life of his or her students. For the administrator, the result of his actions go far beyond good organization to effecting

the life of those he is responsible for as well as the success of the organization as a whole. Let the desire for good actions then be the principal guide, for this is the road to self-satisfaction and true happiness.

> .....and the middle character is sincere and downright both in speech and conduct admitting the real facts about himself without exaggeration or understatement. All of these ways of behaving may be adopted with some object in view, or for no particular object; but normally a person speaks and acts and generally conducts himself in accordance with his real nature unless he has some ulterior object in view.
>
> Ethics. Book IV.

The "ways of behaving" to which Aristotle refers in this statement involve in addition to the middle character the character of the boastful man and the character of the mock-modest man. The boastful man seems to find delight in laying claim to distinctions which he does not possess. On the other hand, the mock-modest man either fails to lay claim to his just distinctions or holds them in less esteem than they really are. Aristotle holds the view that either of these constitutes excess and should be avoided; he advocates that moderation is best. Ethical value, concerned as it is with passions and actions which are marked by excess, defect, and the intermediate, depends upon the mean between two vices.

Aristotle's insistence on the need for moderation in the development of a virtuous character has strong implications for the teacher as well as for the administrator who must seek the middle ground if he or she will be successful in teaching. A teacher's overt behavior and expressed attitudes exert a powerful influence upon young students. Hence it is imperative that he or she be an honest, sincere person whose ethical standards are worthy of imitation. Although students are them-

selves expected to meet reasonable standards of self-control and study effort, their activities should be guided by a teacher who is not given to excess but whose character reflects an excellent middle ground. The administrator, like the teacher, whose behavior is characterized by boastfulness or some other vice will directly or indirectly so influence those in his or her charge.

It is important to bear in mind the conditions under which the intermediate or middle ground can be arrived at especially as both teachers and administrators are affected by them. Some classes of virtuous actions but not all involve quantitative variables other than degrees of feeling. For the temperate man, it may be a question of how much to eat or drink; for the liberal man, the question of how much to give away may determine his actions. But other cases of virtuous actions might not involve quantitative variables. A man is not called brave because he kills neither too many nor too few of the enemy. Again some virtuous actions do not depend on quantitative variables at all, but depend rather on what is done with regard to the right time, the right objects, and the right people.

Aristotle has been criticized for his exposition of the fact that virtue lies in the mid-point between two vices. For instance, Aristotle holds that courage lies in the mean in relation to confidence and fear. But then these are difficult to assess. How brave is the man who goes into battle feeling some fear but not too much? Or how temperate is the man who curtails his enjoyment of the things

around him for fear of enjoying them too much? Is full enjoyment intemperance? Or is it temperate merely to enjoy something only halfway? Yet, while there may be much that is unsatisfactory about Aristotle's doctrine that virtue lies in a mean, it is somewhat unfair to criticize him too severely as though this doctrine is the whole of what he has to say about virtue. What the doctrine does assert is that virtue is manifested in feelings and emotions, and also in actions, which avoid excess and defect and that where action is concerned with extensive quantities, virtue again shows itself in avoiding excess and defect.

In the statement being discussed, Aristotle places much emphasis on character. For him a virtuous courageous action "is one which proceeds from and manifests a certain type of character, and is praised because such a character trait is good or better than others or is a virtue." Therefore "when we speak of a moral quality such as courage, and say that a certain action was courageous, we are not merely saying something about the action." We are going beyond mere reference to what is done, to thinking of the kind of person who performed the action. These points are well made by Bernard Mayo "Ethics of Virtue vs. Ethics of Principle," in Introductory Readings in Ethics, edited by William K. Frankena and John T. Granrose. Mayo also points to the basic moral question for Aristotle as not What shall I do? but rather What Shall I Be? For Aristotle does not posit a set of principles. Instead he puts forth a set of character-traits, a list of certain

types of person - the courageous man, the niggardly man, the boaster, the spendthrift and so on.

The statement under discussion also upholds Aristotle's basic premise that virtue should have no end outside of itself. In his book A Short History of Ethics, Alasdair MacIntyre in Chapter 8 "Postscript to Greek Ethics" endorses this point of view: "Morality indeed cannot have any justification external to itself; if we do not do what is right for its own sake, and whether it is to our interest or not then we are not doing what is right." Aristotle goes far enough in this direction to imply that the presence of ulterior objectives makes it very difficult for a person to behave in accordance with his real nature.

Human behavior and human actions are what ethics is primarily concerned with. As MacIntyre points out, "human actions are not simply bodily movements." For instance the human action of welcoming someone may be identified by a handshake as well as by the putting out of a flag. On the other hand, the movement of legs may be identified with a race or with flight in battle. Therefore, in order that a certain piece of behavior be properly identified as an action or part of a sequence of actions and not merely as bodily movement, it is important that such behavior shows the purpose in part or whole of the agent's intention for acting. This line of thought suffices to highlight the importance of Aristotle's assertion that short of some ulterior motive, a person generally behaves " in accordance with his real nature."

But what is the real nature of man? Is it not toward the tendency to do evil rather than good? Aristotle himself admits that there is no natural tendency to virtuous behavior. What is natural is the capacity to acquire virtue by habituation. The good teaher can take this seriously into account, as he or she considers the importance of helping students to develop good habits. The term habit or practice refers to the repetition of an activity in order to perfect performance. One such good habit is that of study which can be interpreted as a planned program of subject matter mastery. The chief purposes of good study habits are (1) to acquire knowledge and habits which will be useful in meeting new situations, interpreting ideas, making judgements, and creating new ideas, and in the general enrichment of life; (2) to perfect skills and (3) to develop attitudes.

While Aristotle suggests that various motives may prompt various kinds of behavior, he shows a preference for natural behavior. This has serious implications for administrators. As Sayles and Strauss point out in Human Behavior in Organizations, the behavior of management is studied by employees and sometimes they react unfavorably.

It is well known, for instance, that management provides workers with high wages, fringe benefits, good working conditions, good supervision and the like, in the hope of effecting higher morale in the workers and, therefore, causing them to work harder. Aristotle's view is that such behavior stems from ulterior motives. It can also be said that such behavior is natural since it stems from self-interest.

However, it is a matter for serious consideration for at least two reasons. Firstly, morale does not necessarily depend on such benefits. Secondly, if some workers discover what management is doing they might deliberately slow down their activity. They might argue that everyone shares equally in these benefits, and that therefore there is no real reward for good work; this would also help to destroy incentives to increase output. Much depends on the degree of real facts that the workers have at their command. If the workers come to perceive that the employer is not (according to Aristotle) "sincere and downright both in speech and conduct admitting the real facts about himself without exaggeration or understatement," the situation can become serious.

In insisting on "real facts," Aristotle shows concern not only for knowledge, but also for true knowledge. Truth is one of his great virtues: Knowledge can be misleading unless it is true, the real danger is half-truth. According to Alasdair MacIntyre in A Short History of Ethics (p. 96), "Lying as a form of human action, it is often pointed out, logically presupposes a norm of truth telling." Hence administrators and managers as well as teachers must be ever conscious of this fact. Teachers need to be honest with their students, and administrators need to make the truth known to those whom they supervise. It is also said that there is no absolute standard which serves as the principle governing every action. Hence at times individual choices are sometimes made on the basis that very different

codes of honesty lie within a certain range of possibilities. But this should not obviate the need for presenting the real facts.

Note the recurrent emphasis in Aristotle's discussions on the need for objectives or goals. In the statement under discussion he suggests that there are goals or objectives to human behaviors. Teachers should be prepared to help students achieve their goals. Sometimes groups of employees organize to attain certain goals sought by the members of the group and more easily attained by common efforts, and administrators should be aware of this. A class of students may organize itself to work on a common setof problems where the goal of each student is to work the problems correctly. Other goals may be individual goals in the sense that they are the goals of a particular student and are not shared by the other members of the class. Learning experiences may be organized by the teacher to facilitate the achievement of these goals. The English teacher may organize a "free" reading period in which students pursue their own reading interests; the science teacher may encourage students to develop their own projects or experiments.

The implications for administration with regard to goal achievement and behavior are just as striking as they are for teaching. The organization of a group effort implies the hypothesis that such an organization is more likely to lead to the behavior change involved in goal attainment than is some other organization. Grouping procedures may or may not necessarily be more effective than other arrangements

for all purposes. The effectiveness of such groups depends on factors related to group organization and operation. Administrators and teachers must be aware of the fact that a group can be effective in attaining group goals only to the extent that the members of the group are committed to the achievement of the group goal.

In all things it is desirable to seek that middle road which leads to virtue. Aristotle defines virtues as "middle states of character." It therefore behoves teachers as well as administrators to develop and cultivate those attitudes and behaviors in self-discipline, truthfulness, and other virtues which, for their own sakes, can be the essence of the good life.

> In fact there would be no association between man and man if there were no equalization of values, and no equalization of values if there were no commensurability.
>
> Ethics, Book V

This is one of Aristotle's key statements in his discussion of justice. He illustrates the concept of justice through the use of the terms goods, price, and value. He contends that exchange of goods (and consequently, association between men) can be made possible only when all goods have a price. Currency which is a sort of measure has value and equates goods by making them proportionate. Through the exchange of goods, association between men is facilitated. It is the demand for mutual service between parties which helps to bring about mutual exchange. But such reciprocity or exchange is considered just only when the factors involved are of equal value. For instance, a shoemaker is considered equal to a carpenter to the degree that the amount of the shoemaker's work is equal to the amount of the carpenter's work exchanged for it.

Aristotle goes further to make the point that reciprocity, on which justice depends in part, must be more on the basis of proportion than on mere equality. For instance, it seems just when one performs a service in return for another. But real justice demands more: it behoves the one who received the first kindness, in addition to returning it, to take the initiative on the next occasion to do a

service. This kind of action goes beyond merely rendering evil for evil or good deed for good deed. It approaches the Biblical concept of rendering good for evil. The concept of what Aristotle calls "proportionate requital" is fundamental to his general concepts of justice as a particular moral virtue. In other words, he sees justice not only as a means to virtue as an end, but justice as the end, that is, virtue itself.

The idea of exchange of values and the emphasis on the importance of association between man and man in the statement under discussion have great implications for both teaching and administration. Teaching is considerably affected by interpersonal environments and by interactions between teachers and students. As parents provide the objects of the home environment, so do teachers provide the materials for the classroom. Furthermore, the attitude of the teacher toward the student is of crucial importance. Equal values exchanged between teacher and student, help to make teaching successful. The student who learns to value classical music does so, at least in part, because his parents or teachers have indicated their appreciation of this kind of music.

The teacher has a very important place in the environment of the student. That place is more than neutral. All human beings are acting, responding organisms, and much of the activity of a human being originates in the context of his relationship with other people. A student in the presence of another person is aware that this person

is responding to him and is acting on the basis of his reaction. This kind of inter-relationship is called an interaction process. Essentially an interaction process occurs when the behavior of one person serves as a stimulus to evoke responses from the other person and contrariwise. A teacher who calls for order in a classroom may revoke a response of silence from his or her students, and the student who does not respond with silence becomes a stimulus that evokes from the teacher further admonitions to be quiet. Thus, the teacher provides important stimulation to action on the part of the student. In the light of the statement being discussed, such association between teacher and student is made possible through exchange which is characterized by equalization of values and commensurability. The implications for adminstration are equally clear. According to Sayles and Strauss in Human Behavior in Organizations, just as a good teacher is always interested in audience reaction among his students, so "a good supervisor is equally consicious of the need to determine his subordinates' reactions to what he is trying to communicate.." (p. 247)

Aristotle's emphasis on equalization of values and commensurability in the statement under discussion reflects his great concern for justice. He differentiates between distributive justice or fairness and corrective justice which is concerned with redress for harm done. In his book A Short History of Ethics, Alasdair MacIntyre admits that "much of what Aristotle says about justice is illuminating and far from objectionable." (p. 79) It is not difficult to agree with MacIntyre where the implications for both teaching and ad-

ministration of one of Aristotle's statements on justice are concerned. Aristotle states: "Therefore the just is intermediate between gain and loss due to breach of contract; it consists in having an equal amount both before and after the transaction."

Union management relations as reflected in contract negotiations have as much effect on teaching results as on the administrative process. Teachers, today, like other workers, unionize to determine wages, fringe benefits, and working rules and conditions. Usually contracts specify that certain decisions are to be made jointly by management and union. If this should be strictly adhered to, justice will prevail. But so often, management, "in breach of contract," continues to make most of the personnel decisions of hiring, firing, disciplining, promoting, increasing pay, etc. Dissatisfaction on the part of workers as a result of such actions, constitutes grounds for strike; it is, therefore, not uncommon to learn of teachers strikes today. When these occur, however, the educative process is disrupted, effective teaching is hindered, and the students suffer as a result. Workers in industry also stage massive strikes to protest such injustice, thereby slowing down production and at times bringing about much suffering.

The immediate sense in which Aristotle uses the term "values" is concerned with money value. He hints that money serves as a sort of middle term, as it measures all things, and so indicates their superior or inferior value. He even goes further. In order to answer the question of how many pairs of shoes are equal to a house, it is necessary

that there should be one measure for all things. This measure is in fact "demand which holds all things together," but in practice money has become by convention a sort of representative of demand. People express their demand by the amount of money they spend, and their demand is influenced by the things they desire. This raises another and very important dimension of the term "values."

That other dimension involves the meaning of the term "value" as a preference based upon a conception of what is desirable. Values, like attitudes, are orientation processes by which the person is prepared to respond to his environment in predetermined ways. Values, also, are states of readiness or predispositions to act and to be motivated in specific kinds of ways. Like attitudes, values are presumably learned as ways of obtaining need-satisfaction. This fact is important to both the teacher and the administrator. The socialization process of the student as well as of the worker insures the learning of certain behaviors by the application of rewards and punishments. Out of this process they learn what is regarded by society as desirable and undesirable behavior. From these conceptions they form their value standards. These value standards are important guides for teachers and administrators who must seek to foster the development of desirable values and to reward behavior that is consonant with such values.

The question of value formation and acquisition is of paramount importance to successful teaching. Like attitudes, the learning of

of values is facilitated by the identification process. Hence, there are tremendous implications for teaching as well as for administration in Aristotle's insistence on "equalization of values" as a prime condition for " association between man and man." If the student's values as well as attitudes are to be influenced by the teacher, then there is a need for the teacher to be an identification figure for the student. Such a teacher must meet two conditions: (1) he or she must have sufficient prestige so that adopting his or her values will be rewarding for the student; (2) a unique relationship must be established between the teacher and the student.

Aristotle's expression "equalization of values" as a condition for desirable "association between man and man," also has other implications for teaching and administration. The value system like the attitudinal system of a person, influences his or her cognitive processes. It can be said that the degree and kind of response of an individual depends on the degree and nature of his or her values in relation to the stimulus. A student responds quickly to a stimulus which is at once consistent with his values system. On the other hand, a student responds less quickly to stimuli which are less consistent with his attitudinal - value system. It is also important to realize that the degree to which previously learned values have been imbedded in the student will indicate the degree of difficulty the teacher will face in his efforts to influence the student's value system.

Justice, to Aristotle, is the mean between doing injustice and suffering it. So much of his arguments tend to seek that middle ground which is very hard to find. Injustice involves an action in which there is both excess and defect, i.e. both a wrongful winner and a wrongful loser. The unjust act is one in which the agent takes too much for himself or gives too little to others. But Aristotle himself admits that the mean of justice is not the same as the other virtues for the special reason that justice being absolute has no middle ground. Justice therefore, is not a mean in this sense, whereas injustice itself is an extreme because it expresses itself in actions which are both excessive and defective.

One of the standards which Aristotle strongly upholds is fairness. Unfair amounts violate proportion, and such imbalance marked by both too much and too little violates the law of proportion and breeds injustice. Disporportions involve unjust results in which one party has too much and the other too little, whether what is being divided is advantages or disadvantages, goods or evils. The just result, on the other hand, indicates that both parties have the fair or right amount, whether of good or bad. Hence, the standard measure of just actions is the distribution, assigning, or taking the fair or mean amount, and justice itself is the state or character in virtue of which the just man deliberately assigns either to himself and to another, or to the two parties to a suit, the fair share of advantage or disadvantage, as the case may be. In this approach,

through commensurability, justice can be realized.

The implications of commensurability for teaching and administration are weighty. In teaching, in order that justice be achieved in grading, it is important that standard objective measurements be set up for test performances. The testing device or measurement procedure must be constructed in such a way that everyone who understands and uses the measurement procedure will obtain approximately the same score for a student's performance. A measure of student performance, for instance, is unreliable if the scoring procedure tend to place the student in a different relative position each time the performance is scored independently. The use of certain standard procedures improves the reliability of grading essay questions or any type of performance in which the behavior to be measured is complex. Where several teachers are to grade essay examinations on the same subject matter, the teachers should agree in advance on the criteria for grading. In this way not only will commensurability be achieved, but fairplay and justice will be done.

The question of commensurability can hardly be over-emphasized. ~~Note that~~ In the statement under discussion, its position seems to indicate that on it depends "equalization of values," on which depends "exchange," on which depends "association between man and man." It seems to be, indeed, the cornerstone of justice. This is important to teachers as well as administrators. So often teachers make evaluative judgments based on a presumed measure of the absolute amount of

a student's knowledge just as an administrator makes similar judgments based on a presumed measure of his or her subordinate's performance. The teacher cannot infer from the student's failure to answer one question a complete absence of knowledge of the facts in a given subject. Nor can the administrator base total judgment of an individual's performance in one or two instances. Such a lack of true measurement only engenders unfairness and injustice. It is incumbent upon teachers and administrators alike to aim at justice and equality for all.

> It remains therefore that prudence is a true and rational quality or capacity of acting with regard to things that are good or bad for man.
>
> Ethics, Book VI

In this statement, expressed and understood, is the relationship between practical wisdom and virtue which Aristotle attempts to establish. To him prudence or wisdom is of two kinds--theoretical and practical. Theoretical wisdom is concerned with scientific knowledge and the intelligence of things instead of with things that make a man happy. Practical wisdom, on the other hand, is concerned with human affairs about which deliberation is possible. It is practical wisdom that he is particularly concerned about, emphasizing that deliberating well is its most characteristic function. Aristotle strengthens the relationship between practical wisdom and virtue by his pronouncment that "virtue in the full sense cannot be attained without practical wisdom."

Not only does Aristotle endeavor to strengthen the relationship between practical wisdom and virtue, but also between practical wisdom and action. A man's action is determined by the nature of his practical wisdom and moral virtue; wisdom provides the right aim and direction while virtue provides the means to attain a certain kind of action. But Aristotle also insists that practical wisdom as an entity is very important just for its own sake; it is akin to virtue which is a quality excellent in itself, and considered as an (desirable) end in itself and not as a means to an end. Such double faceted views are characteristic of much that Aristotle has to say on these matters.

The double aspect feature of the statement under discussion is significant. On the one hand, Aristotle is saying that practical wisdom is not

a necessity for action, or that actions are not necessarily dependent upon or influenced by practical wisdom. That implies that actions can be independent or knowledge or practical wisdom. Earlier in the Ethics, Aristotle sustains this view by stating that one's ability to perform certain actions "is no way enhanced by knowing them, since the virtues are characteristics (that is to say fixed capacities for action, acquired by habit)."

On the other hand, Aristotle is equally firm that actions do indeed depend on practical wisdom. In fact, he ventures to say that no right choice of action is possible without practical wisdom and virtue. In this light, he sets up a distinct relationship between knowledge and action. He is saying that knowledge or practical wisdom is good for its own sake, and it is also important as a means to an end, that end being action. It is interesting to note that strong arguments can be put forward in support of whichever view is proposed. This is important, for such an exercise at once brings one face to face with the problems of moral philosophy, and the contemplation of such opposing ideas as determinism and relativism, self-love and benevolence, utility and pleasure.

The problems of moral philosophy in these matters is very well expressed in a statement by Joseph Butler on "Self-love and Benevolence," in Problems of Moral Philosophy, edited by Paul W. Taylor (p. 114):

> I must remind you that though benevolence and self-love are different; though the former tends to public good, and the latter to private; yet they are so perfectly coincident, that the greatest satisfactions to ourselves depend upon our having benevolence in a due degree; and that self-love is one chief security of our right behavior towards society. It may be added, that their mutual coinciding, so that we can scarce promote one without the other, is equally proof that we were made for both.

Perhaps the greatest of these problems is that of the question of good and evil as they stand in relation to the nature of man. Is man's nature inherently good or is it inherently evil? This age old problem has been the battle ground of the philosophers for centuries. Aristotle has been seemingly pre-occupied with it himself. Again and again he propounds the view that "none of the moral virtues is implanted in us by nature." Rather, he holds, "nature gives us the capacity for receiving them, and this capacity is developed through habit." It would seem that the emphasis here is that man's nature is neither good nor bad, but that man becomes good or bad through his performance of good or bad actions.

Aristotle discusses virtue in the light of what is good or bad in man's nature; he, at times, tends to lean heavily toward the view that man's inherent nature is neither good nor bad. In Book II he states that "men become good or bad builders according as they practice building well or badly. If this were not so, they would require no instruction, but would all have been born good or bad at their trades. So too is the case of virtues." This view is shared by John Locke. Locke's tabla rasa theory suggests that the mind at birth is like a blank tablet and the experience gained through the senses writes on this tablet. Such a view appears to stand midway between Christianity and Medieval ethics which emphasize the essential wickedness of man's nature, and modern ethics which stresses the inherent goodness of man's nature. The latter view is exemplified in the writings of such philosophers as Jean Jacques Roussean who felt the the simple virtues of natural man were corrupted by the artificial and corrupt product of modern society.

What makes Aristotle so interesting is the diversity of his views. While he seems to agree that man's nature is neither good nor bad, he also takes the

position that man's nature is either good or bad: "the various moral qualities are in a way bestowed by nature." Whichever way we look at his views, however, they are distinct from those of the Bible and the medieval philosophers like St. Thomas Acquinas and others who maintain that man's real nature is definitely evil, and the modern philosophers who argue that man is good by nature.

The issues discussed here have important implications for both teaching and administration, and especially for teaching, when they are considered in the light of the controversy between hereditary and environmental factors. If each student brings to the world of experience a different hereditary endowment, then the teacher's task is a challenge to cope with the various situations. The teacher must study such endowments, for it is the interaction of the student's native endowments or potentialities with his experiences which results in the development of his personality. The good teacher will not expect the student who is physically or mentally handicapped to develop in the same way as the student who is not handicapped.

A consideration of the view that man's nature is good or that his nature is evil, brings one face to face with the question of the influence of heredity. The teacher, like the administrator, will expect that those under his care with no special handicaps must develop within the limits set by their native capacity. It cannot be expected that the student with average intelligence will become a theoretical physicist, nor will the student of mediocre musical aptitude develop into a concert pianist. It is true, however, that with excellent teaching, certain native talents, though seemingly limited, can be guided to remarkable development.

The consequences of environmental influences are equally important. The teacher as well as the administrator should take special note of the fact that

each environment has unique features as well as characteristics common to other environments. While there may be similar curricula, methods, and materials for certain classes, the environment within each classroom could be remarkably different. The infinite variations in personality result from the use that the human organism makes of its environmental opportunities as well as from differences in native capacity.

The two classes of environments which influence the behavior patterns that affect the results of teaching and administration are (1) the cultural environment and (2) the interpersonal environment. The cultural environment includes distinctive physical objects such as the home in which the student lives, the furniture in this home, automobiles, pictures, or the clothes he or she wears. Persons, however, are more important and they constitute the second environmental influence. Parents provide the objects of the home environments, teachers provide the materials for the classroom, and administrators provide the environment for their subordinates. Schools, colleges, and universities, in the light of the environment theory, at once become institutional agencies which contribute to the total educational or socialization process directed to the development of the personalities of the students.

It is important to note that neither native capacity nor environment alone can account for personality differences. This idea certainly cuts across the polarized views of Christianity and the modern philosophers, and accentuates the need for what Aristotle calls prudence. The chief achievement of the prudent man, Aristotle advocates, is that he deliberates wisely. He continues to exalt prudence which is concerned with general principles as well as details. Aristotle further credits prudence with the power to provide insight into the means of procuring happiness. It studies actions which are just and noble and

good for mankind. Moreover, Aristotle suggests that prudent deliberations lead to actions that are good or bad for man; in other words, they lead to actions that result in pleasure or pain.

The concept of good has ever been associated with pleasure or happiness. It is true that so often philosophers are not completely in agreement as to whether "good" means happiness or that which is desired. However, on "The Subject-Matter of Ethics," in Introductory Readings in Ethics, edited by W. K. Frankena and J. T. Grantrose, G. E. Moore warns that if good is defined as anything else beside pleasure, then ethics has to face the problem that it will be impossible "either to prove that any other definition is wrong or even to deny such definition." (p. 386) But Henry Sidgwick further provokes the situation in his comments on Plato's concept of the good. He points out that Plato apparently maintained that pleasures is the good. Yet Sidgwick states that "it is found further that the feelings most prominently recognized as pleasures are bound up with pain, as good can never be with evil." (p. 49)

Such analyses serve to reinforce the difficulties attending the study of moral philosophy. At a glance, one is inclined to accept the fact, according to Aristotle, that prudence will lead to actions that are good or bad for men. Then if good is interpreted as pleasure, bad should be thought of as pain. But further analysis, as Sidgwick points out, shows that problems arise as soon as man begins to define good as pleasure. Bad, then, becomes pain, and if pleasure sometimes includes pain, then logically good should also sometime include bad. But this can never be!

In view of the analysis presented here, it can be concluded that Aristotle's statement carry weighty implications for both teachers and administrators. It is important that they exercise great prudence in their dealings with those

entrusted to their care. For indeed there is much to his insistence that "prudence is a rational and true capacity directed to the attainment of the good of man."

> Not everybody whose conduct is guided by pleasure is either self-indulgent and base or lacking in self-restraint, but only those whose motive is pleasure of a disgraceful kind.
>
> Ethics, Book VII.

Two very important concepts, pleasure and self-restraint are raised in this statement. These concepts constitute the basis of Aristotle's discussion of weakness of will, and repeatedly he seeks to show how closely they stand in relation to each other. Aristotle argues that the man of self-restraint, like the man who possesses the virtue of self-control, is never led by the pleasures of the body to act against principle. It is true that he admits that there is a great difference between the self-restrained man and the man of self-control. The latter, because of his nature, takes no pleasure in things that are contrary to principle, while the former does feel pleasure in such things but does not yield to them.

The word pleasure brings to mind at least two meanings: one being that pleasure is good, the other that pleasure pertains to bodily functions and satisfactions. For instance, certain bodily pleasures are satisfied by yielding to passions and desires which are not necessarily good. It is not always good to yield to bodily cravings, for these may be connected to evil desires. In this connection, Aristotle asks two poignant questions: "Can we then call a man self-restrained if he abides by a principle or purpose of any kind, or must it be a right purpose?" He answers the question by pointing out that though incidentally it may be any principle of purpose, essentially it is the true principle and the right purpose.

It is clear that in the statement under discussion, Aristotle warns against a certain kind of pleasure, that which is disgraceful. It is for

this reason that the pursuit of pleasure should be guided by right principles and right purposes, and above all, the principle of goodness. Eudoxus, the Greek philosopher, held that pleasure was the good, because he saw that all things whether rational or irrational make pleasure their aim. He argued that in all cases that which is good, and that which is most desirable is most good, and that which is good for all, and is the aim of all, is the good.

Plato, on the other hand, tried to prove that pleasure is not the good, or at least not the chief good. He argued that the pleasant life is more desirable with the addition of prudence than without it. Consequently, if such a combination of pleasure and prudence is better, then pleasure alone could not be the chief good, as the good itself cannot be made more desirable by any addition. To Plato, if pleasure be recognized as good, it can only be from its tendency to produce some further good. Aristotle in a way, concurs with this view when he indicates that pleasure is a means of perfecting life in each person, by way of perfecting his activities. Since there are different kinds of activities, there are also different kinds of pleasures. The pleasure which is proper to a virtuous activity is good, and that which is proper to a low activity is vicious.

Not only is it important to differentiate between good and bad pleasure, but it is equally important to be fully aware that the same things give pleasure to some people and pain to others. For instance, sweet things do not seem sweet alike to a person in a fever and to a person in good health, nor does the same thing seem hot alike to an invalid and to a person in good physical condition. It is also true that the pleasures of the intellect are different from the pleasures of the senses, and these again are different in kind from one another. It follows, therefore, that the pleasure which

perfect activities which in turn perfect life are all different. The desires and pleasures of what is noble are laudable, while the pleasures and desires of what is disgraceful are censurable. It is this latter which is objectionable to Aristotle.

Further, Aristotle emphasizes the motive behind pleasure that is disgraceful. Motives are indeed a very important factor in ethics. A. C. Ewing states in "Against Ethical Egoism," in Introductory Reading in Ethics, edited by William K. Frankena and John T. Grantrose, that "it is not only the external act, but the motive which counts in ethics." (p. 59) Technically speaking, a man who admits that he refrains from stealing only for fear of being sent to prison might be condemned as much or almost as much as if he had been guilty of theft, for his motive is not recognized as a proper one. Of course, such reasoning at once prompts other considerations. For instance, how much morality can be attributed to the man who refrains from wrong acts in general merely because he is lured by the prospect of happiness or because he dreads the punishment that accompanies such acts whether in this life or in the next? These are basic questions which help to decide whether or not a person's conduct is either self-indulgent and base, or lacking in self-restraint.

The question of self-restraint is very important to Aristotle. He tends to draw a line between the un-restrained man and the self-indulgent man. The latter does not repent of his excesses inasmuch as he follows a line of conduct that he has deliberately chosen. The man who lacks self-restraint, on the other hand, always repents his indulgencies afterwards. The two forms of un-restraint are impetuosity and weakness of character. The weak character

deliberates, but passions prevent the keeping of resolutions formed earlier. The impetuous character does not stop to deliberate and is consequently guided by passions. A man who lacks self-restraint pursues excessive and improper bodily pleasures without believing them to be of value, while a self-indulgent man is convinced that they are valuable and pursues them because it is his nature to do so. Aristotle contends that "the un-restrained are not wicked, but they do wicked things." Such considerations have important implications for administration as well as for teaching.

Both the teacher and the administrator will do well to heed Aristotle's advice on self-restraint, or lack of it, and its relation to the pleasure motive. In order to understand human motives, one has to understand the basic desires that are present in all normal human beings. As an aid to the process of development from birth onward, a human being's behavior is influenced by a host of potential desires and cravings that operate as the driving forces of his life's activities. Motives, arising out of natural urges or acquired interests, are dynamic forces that affect thoughts, emotions, and behavior. Generally, as a result of education, a person is motivated to satisfy bodily needs adequately, to realize a purpose or an ideal, or to achieve personal satisfaction in a socially desirable society. The good teacher gives serious thought to the view that motives are potent factors in learning.

Motives encourage the learner in his learning activities. A student may give special attention to those subjects which he considers practical and that will be of value to him as a means of earning a living. One often hears a student complain that he sees no reason for studying a certain subject. From the student's point of view there is no motive to be satisfied through expenditure of energy on a subject that, at the time of the

learning, has no practical value. Motives also act as selectors of the type of activity in which the person desires to engage. For example, a newspaper means different things to different people: a young man may turn first to the sports page while an older man may be interested in the stock market. Motives also direct behavior; the learner must be helped to want to learn that which he should learn. Frankly, the teacher should be prepared to lead the student to see meaning in his or her learning activities, otherwise the student will be unlikely to succeed.

Motivation is concerned with the arousal of interest in learning, and to that extent, is basic to learning. The teacher should ever be on the alert to discover stimuli that will produce pleasant feelings or satisfaction in order that the interest of the learner be maintained long enough for him or her to master definite ideas or subject matter. Lesson plans and outlines should be considered incomplete unless they include motivation. The teacher must always endeavor to relate the content of the new learning material to experiences with which the learner is familiar and which gives him satisfaction.

The administrator too can effectively motivate his subordinates who look to him for instructional leadership. He or she should exhibit great skill in human relations, a thoroughly democratic philosophy including faith in the potentialities of the staff, and a deep conviction of the effectiveness and values of group processes. Other qualities that would aid motivation are skill in group discussion techniques, a broad general scholarship in education, a willingness to share authority and credit with others, and an emotional stability and maturity which stem from faith in himself as a leader and as a person. It is also important that the admin-

istrative philosophy match the philosophy of the educational program of the college or university. It is consistent to practice imposed supervision in a college which believes in an imposed curriculum, imposed marks, etc. On the other hand, a college which believes in and practices a life-centered learning program, or cooperative planning of learning experiences by pupils and teachers, should have a cooperative program of instructional improvement as a natural corollary.

The statement under discussion has further implications for teachers and administrators if the words "motive" and "pleasure" are viewed from the standpoint of human drives and desires. Numerous impulses arise in every human being from his bodily needs. An individual yearns for the things that strengthen his feeling of well-being. The urge to be successful, the urge for mastering, and the urge for recognition and approval constantly express themselves in all sorts of ways. There is nothing wrong with these urges; they stimulated him to action that leads to fulfillment. The pleasure derived from success-producing activity becomes the motivating force that stimulates similar attempts at other times. Feelings of satisfaction accrue from planning an action, perfecting a skill, or solving a problem. But it is important that both the teacher and administrator avoid courses of action that contain seeds of self-indulgence or that demonstrate a lack of self-restraint. It is even more important that disgraceful actions be avoided.

A common urge that can sometimes easily lead to disgraceful actions is the urge to avoid failure. Both teachers and administrators should heed Aristotle's warning in this respect and avoid pleasure motives of a disgraceful kind. First of all, teachers should emphasize success and should make it possible for their pupils to experience some progress even though

it is achieved slowly. But neither teachers nor administrators should over-emphasize success, for then they might instigate students to attempt to employ any means to achieve success. Students who feel that they must succeed to meet the teacher's high expectations may resort to copying or other forms of cheating. In this way, the students' conduct can become self-indulgent and base or lacking in self-restraint.

It is important that both teachers and administrators recognize that they are potential stimuli of fear. Little do they realize the extent to which they create fear in sensitive learners. In a similar manner, supervisors are fear-producing stimuli for teachers or others under their supervision. The fact of failure cannot be eliminated from learning, but the fear of failure as a deterrent force should be removed as far as it is possible to do so.

In the light of the present discussion, the urge for mastery should be properly guarded. This dominant urge underlying human behavior seeks to do something better than someone else. Action stemming from such an urge can easily be of disgraceful kind. Indeed, occasionally an individual's attempt to establish superiority in an activity or situation are responses to a realization on his part of his own weaknesses. For example, an uninformed person may be much more assertive in his expression of opinions than is the individual who is more thoroughly acquainted with the issue in question. If an individual attempts to achieve superiority through the utilization of a socially unaccepted technique, the total effect will be undesirable or what Aristotle outrightly labels "disgraceful."

It is unfortunate for an individual to turn to unfair means to accomplish his aims. For him to cheat, to lie, to steal, or to use any other false means to secure the approval of others, or to gain a feeling of superiority, is

likely to be harmful to him and to the group affected. However, the urge for mastery is strong. Combined with the urge to avoid failure, the mastery urge operates as a strong motivating force for the individual and that causes a reduction in his moral stamina. An individual who is affected thus by his inner urges needs sympathetic help the first time that he gives evidence of this attitude. Neither the wise teacher nor administrator will desert the victim at this time, but will attempt to provide opportunities through example and other means for him or her to regain self-respect and the good opinion of others. Too often a single misstep, such as cheating in a test, labels a student as a cheat for the remainder of his college years.

The urge for recognition and approval as it relates to teaching and administration should be taken no less seriously in the context of the statement being discussed. Self-indulgence and lack of restraint can also easily accompany such an urge. When a student fails to receive the recognition and approval for his efforts that he believes to be his due, he devises other ways and means of gaining the attention of the teacher, and often such means are undesirable. The administrator, the teacher, and the businessman all know the value of the wise use of praise. Approval of work well done, or even of the effort to do it, will gain in cooperation what criticism can never hope to accomplish. Praise, however, should be given only when it is actually deserved; otherwise, it may be looked upon as empty words or a kind of bribe. To evaluate critically either production or behavior is the duty of the teacher or administrator in the development of attitudes which will function in living.

In all this, as in other ways, Aristotle pleads for the middle ground. He states that "there is a sort of person who takes not more but less than the proper amount of pleasure in his bodily functions and who fails to abide by principle, in that respect." He continues: "The self-restrained man therefore is intermediate between this character and the unrestrained man." By enjoying pleasures, too, the unrestrained man violates principle while the opposite character disregards principle by enjoying them too little. The self-restrained man is guided by principle and is not led away by either extreme. Teachers and administrators have much to learn from this. Self-restraint, according to Aristotle, is a good quality, which is very closely akin to the virtue of self-control.

. . . . . for equality is said to be a tie of Friendship.

Ethics, Book VIII

Aristotle has suggested that there is a strong relationship between the state of equality and that of friendship. He insists that equality and similarity constitute the basis of friendly feelings, especially when mutual moral excellence is the essence of such similarity. Two people of similar moral virtues being steadfast in themselves are likely to stand firm by one another, for they tend to offer each other only worthy services. Indeed, they may even act as a check on each other, since a good man does not err himself and therefore would not allow his friend to err. The two parties might indeed expect the same return from each other in proportion to the love and friendship mutually given.

The element of equal proportions is important. Good men in loving their friends, do so in the same proportion as they love their own good. In this way, either party repays his friend equally, both in wishing him well and in doing him good. This is indeed noble, for such actions tend to carry in themselves the implications of the golden rule; do unto others as you would have them do unto you. It is all the more impressive when the motives that prompt such mutual friendliness are pure. Lasting fiendliness and companionship are engendered when people are mutually pleasurable and take mutual

pleasure in the same things.

Aristotle's warning against so-called mutual friendship not based on genuine goodness should not be taken lightly:

> They who speedily commence an interchange of friendly actions may be said to wish to be friends, but they are not so unless they are proper objects of friendship and mutually known to be such: that is to say, a desire for friendship may arise quickly but not friendship itself.

He further cautions against making profit, rather than pleasure, the motive of true friendship:

> Where people do not interchange pleasure but profit in matters of love, the friendship is both less intense in degree and also less permanent.

The proper basis of true friendship, then, consists in the mutual recognition of goodness and the quality of giving. The essential character of this friendship is that of wishing good to another for that other's sake. Nobility of character in friendship is further exemplified in the idea that the more one receives, the more he should give. This idea is consonant with the Biblical principle that to whom much is given, much is expected. It is expected, then, that people of the same position, wealth, and status in life bestow mutual friendship on each other. This idea of mutuality and equality is important in the sense of parity in all things, pertaining to friendship, whether this means that the same things accure to both, and they wish the same things to each other, or whether they barter one thing

against another, such as pleasure against profit.

The concept of equality is even more important in the sense that it can guide ~~our~~ one's actions toward friendship even in situations that are outwardly unequal. This is exemplified in the case of friendship which exists between parties who are not equal to each other from the standpoint of status, wealth, or position. One should consider the friendship which exists between father and son, mother and child, elder and younger, or a rich man and a poor man. The last mentioned carries weighty implications for equality, for a rich man will easily bestow friendship on a poor man if he is guided by the principle that all men are created equal. History also teaches that the degree of friendship which a child bestows on his parents later in life is largely dependent on the extent of parental love, devotion, and friendship throughout the early years of the child's life.

But this relationship between parent and child has other implications with regard to equality. The pleasure that some mothers obtain from the love that they bestow on their children without the thought of being repaid is enough to make one realize that the idea of equal return for friendship should not be pressed too far. Aristotle has observed that "in its essence friendship seems to consist more in giving than in receiving affection." He continues:

> Therefore as friendship consists more in bestowing than in receiving affection and as it is considered praiseworthy to love one's friends the mark of true friendship seems to be affection.

The idea that affection is the mark of true friendship is significant. An understanding of this raises the question of the need for some modification of Aristotle's claim that the essential attribute of true perfect and permanent friendship is that each party receive from the other the same or similar benefits in all respects. If such a criterion be accepted without qualification, then the important attribute of love or affection is only of secondary importance. For love prompts man, in the words of the New Testament of the Bible, "to love [his] enemies, bless them that curse [him], and do good to them that despitefully use [him]." In other words, a good man is expected to be friendly not only to another good man, but also to a wicked man, indeed even to his enemies. This view supersedes that of the Old Testament which recommended "an eye for an eye and a tooth for a tooth."

The New Testament's emphasis on love and friendliness toward one's enemies also supersedes Aristotle's notion that "it is not possible to have many friends in the full sense of the term friendship,... nor is it possible for a person to feel very strong esteem for a number of people at once." Indeed, it should be possible to have many friends if one's love extends beyond the bounds of loving others or doing good to them in expectation for a return of their love and friendship. According to the New Testament, man is expected to love all men equally and not because they are good or have been kind or friendly toward him. There is no basis here for exclusion of anyone; in fact, it is rather expected that each person show more friendliness and

love toward the outcast and downtrodden and those who might not be as good as he is.

The implications of the statement under discussion for teaching and administration are many and varied. It is important that the teacher exhibit equal friendliness and love for all students in order to avoid charges of favoritism or bias. The teacher ought to study the nature and tendencies of all the students committed to his care. A man or woman may be temperamentally fitted to teach and very much interested in working with young people, but unless he has adequate knowledge of the sequential pattern of human development, he is likely to be an ineffective teacher. The causal factors underlying the many vagaries displayed in student behavior must be understood by a teacher so that he can provide opportunities for his students to develop well. This demands that the teacher not only bestow equal love and friendship to all students alike, but indeed more love and friendship to those that need them most.

One method of assuring that equality in dealing with students is achieved is through provision for individual differences among students. There is a tendency to place emphasis upon group ability to achieve better in one learning field rather than in another. the students of one geographical area, social class, or school population may be referred to as brighter or slower then those of another group. The same principle seems to hold in administration and management as supervisors tend to deal with their subordinates in groups rather

than as individuals. But since they deal with individuals, it is the function of teaching as well as administration to provide adequately and equally for everyone within its budgetary, personnel, and curricular limitations.

It is no easy task to prepare equally for everyone. If such is to be achieved, however, measuring instruments should be devised that would help discover differences early and accurately. This would help both teacher and administrator in the provision of opportunities for achievements within the limits of potentialities. The physical and social enviornment of each individual should be studied as a factor of development of native potentialities. Adequate and well trained personnel should be provided so that ~~each~~ individual students can be known and taught as such. All agencies of education in their teaching and administrative capacities, should provide equal opportunities for all individuals to achieve a full and useful life. This is a good way to express fully what is meant by equality and friendliness.

The element of friendship on the basis of equality also has implications for teaching and administration from the standpoint of relationships between teacher and student, teachers themselves, administrators and subordinates, as well as between schools, college or university and the community. Both teacher and student stand to benefit if there is a friendly relationship between them. Such a relationship engenders confidence and respect in each other, resulting in student achievement and success in the teacher's work. It is

also important that friendly feelings prevail among teachers themselves, as internal dissension within the faculty arising from widely divergent and conflicting educational points of view does little to generate confidence in the institution and its staff.

The importance of the need to operate a good and friendly school, college, university, or management firm can hardly be overstressed. One of the most effective means of achieving community cooperation and support is to operate an obviously good learning program, to administer the school, college, or university well, and to maintain an atmosphere of warmth and friendliness. Such an atmosphere depends on proper and equal consideration of others, give and take, and love and understanding among all. An institution where students are happy and are learning those things which help them to live better does not have a difficult time in enlisting the sympathy and support of its community.

The implications of friendliness through equality go even further. It is good to establish working relationships with other organized community groups. In every community there are organized groups seeking many of the same objectives as the schools, colleges, and universities. It behooves these institutions whose influences and functions pervade the community, to seek to integrate and systematize the work of certain coordinating councils in the community in an effort to help solve community problems. It is also desirable that such institutions keep the community informed about their work, which

also helps to establish friendship. Moreover, care should be exercised to base such friendship on goodness rather than on motives for gain or profit.

Friendship based on motives or profit seem generally to be formed out of what Aristotle calls "contrary elements." Through this medium, a poor man may become a friend of the rich, and the ignorant man a friend of the informed man. At first glance, one is tempted to see only unequal dimensions in such instances. But a consideration of the fact that the person who operates for profit, gives something in return for the friendship he desires, prompts other considerations. It might be, that after all, the sacrifices the dependent man makes is in proportion to the friendship be receives. If this is the case, then it still holds that "equality is said to be a tie of friendship." But the strength of the profit-motive should not be taken lightly.

The profit-motive in friendship has strong implications for both teaching and administration. Historically speaking, the profit-motive was, in fact, a means of making sure that the goods and services required by society would be produce economically. Moreover, if each individual employed his capital and his labor to make the highest profit possible, he not only served his own interests but those of society as well. Individual self-interest would add up to the social good. Finally, since wages, profits, interest, and rent were the resultants of free competition in a free market, all the participants in the economics would receive a just reward for their several contri-

butions. Such expressions as "free competition" and "participation" suggest "equality" and "friendship" respectively, that "each receives a just reward" is indicative of justice and equality. Good teaching and administration are to some extent still being guided by the profit or self-interest motive principle today, which underscores the relationship between equality and friendship.

There is little doubt that Aristotle's statement that "equality is said to be a tie of friendship" is very significant. If the principle of equality as it relates to friendship is infringed upon, undesirable results are bound to follow. Quarrels arise in those friendships in which the parties are unequal, because each party thinks himself entitled to the greater share, and this often causes the friendship to be destroyed. The man who thinks himself better than another, also thinks that having the greater share belongs to him by right, on the grounds that more is always awarded to the better man. On the other hand, the lesser man insists that it is the business of a good friend to help those who are in need, otherwise what is the use of having a good or powerful friend.

In order, therefore, to avoid the possibility of extremes in the matter of the relationship between equality and friendship, it is necessary that like rules be observed in the intercourse of friends who are unequal. For best results, it is good to bear in mind that true friendship requires what is possible rather than what is strictly due, for it is unfair to expect an equal return of

friendship from two parties who are unequal. It is the capacity for friendly requiting which is important.

It must be pointed out that Aristotle hints that the things one loves determine the types of friendships one makes. In general, man loves three things; the good, the pleasant, and the useful. Thus, one kind of friendship is based on his desire to use his friends socially, politically, or in business. Another kind of friendship is based on the delight or pleasure that is derived from someone's company. Finally, the basis of friendship can be a pure and good motive. This last is the best kind of friendship. Friendship based on ulterior motives is soon destroyed, but friendship based on virtue will stand the test of time as long as the friends maintain the same character.